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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

'VILLARD Y. MORRIS, Executor of
the Estate of 'Yilliam Shields,
Respondent,
Case No. 7630

vs.
TED RUSSELL and :MANILA RUSSELL, his 'vife,
Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

'Ve find great difficulty in conforming to the prescribed rules concerning the controverting of appellants'
Statement of Facts. Appellants' Statement is lengthy,
covering 13 pages, and the transcript likewise is lengthy.
Although appellants' facts as recited are correct as supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ported by some parts of the record, yet they are onesided and pick out the evidence 1nost favorable to appellants, they having omitted any reference to the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses or to the testimony of their
witnesses who appeared unfavorable to them. We present our version of the facts as the most expedient
method of controverting and qualifying the facts stated
by appellants.
Appellants correctly relate the pleadings in the case
and the trial of the cause, including defendants' moving
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence for a nonsuit or
dismissal of both causes of action, and the court's granting the motion as to the quantun1 meruit count.
William Shields, plaintiff and respondent, went to
work on defendants' farm in November, 1941, for board
and room and "snmll wages." lie stayed under this arrangement until the sumn1er of 1943 and made no claim
for any part of the time he worked on the farm, since
defendants had fulfilled that part of the en1ployment
contract.
In June, 1943, the defendants were leaving the farm,
having bought a tourist court on South State Street.
The war was then on in full blast. Jobs were plentiful
and wages were high (52). It was plaintiff's intention
to go out and get a new job (51), but defendants told
plain tiff if he would go with them to the tourist court,
they would give him big wages and he wouldn't have hard
work to do (51-80). Before plaintiff consented to go
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down there with them, he had an understanding that
they would pay him "big wages" (51). The amount was
set at $100.00 per month plus board and room ( 52-89).
Plaintiff testified that he went down with the understanding that he was supposed to do light duties (53),
but when he went down to the court, he testified he had
"beds to make, floors to scrub and mop, then the painting
to do, then the lights, to keep the place clean, collect
rents" (52). He had to gather up the garbage, burn all
he could burn of it, and dispose of the rest (53). Plaintiff scrubbed walls in the cabins, changed the linen on the
beds, shoveled all the snow from the premises (53). Plaintiff took care of 21 units, exclusive of the two units in
defendants' home (54). Plaintiff did the necessary
plumbing repairs and did the emergency electrical repairs. He painted cabins inside and out (54).
There' were quite a number of trees cmning do\vn
the north side of the premises, then across and up the
south side. Plaintiff grubbed the trees out so they could
be removed. These were big box elders and willow trees.
Plaintiff then cut them up (54 & 87). He was put to work
removing these trees to make way for the first five new
cabins defendants were to build. Plaintiff cut the wood
into fire wood lengths and sold it, and defendant Ted
Russell took one-half of these proceeds from plaintiff
(55).
Plaintiff all alone dug 1100 feet of 9-foot deep sewer
trench (82) for the laying of pipe, commencing from the
South side of the cabins on State Street down to within
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

50 feet of Main Street, across the driveway, and up the
south side of the north cabins (56-83). Plaintiff laid the
pipe in this trench ( 82).
Plaintiff helped tear down the first five cabins, and
helped tear down and rebuild some more, but didn't
remember exact!ly how many. Plaintiff put in the forms
on which to build the new cabins (56). He was required
to do all the inside digging (for installation of sewer,
plumbing pipes, gas line, etc.) on all the cabins remodeled
(56). Plaintiff installed the water pipe and gas pipe in
the first five cabins ( 85), on which the contractor was to
pay him for the inside digging.
The cabins on the south side were remodeled. He
participated in that, and the rest romn vv-hich was torn
out and remodeled (57). On the first five south cabins
remodeled, plaintiff testified Ted Russell helped plaintiff do the remodeling, rather than Shields helping Russell (58). Plaintiff assisted in the tearing down andrebuilding of approximately 19 cabins (58), he estimated.
Plaintiff got up and worked on the garbage before
defendants aroEle, and part of the time did a lot of work
on the cabins befor,e breakfast. Plaintiff generally got
up about 8 :30, and sometimes quit at dark, sometimes
worked until 7 :00 p.m. and sometimes worked until after
midnight, depending on what he was doing. He stayed
with the work until it was done (59). Every morning,
defendants gave him a list of what to do and he worked
until he finished it ( 66). l-Ie was alone in charge of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entire tourist court in the su1n1ner time when defendants
went fishing two or three days at the end of each week
(59). One tin1e they went to Boston via Florida and he
was left alone in charge from three to four weeks ( 60
& 88), and had the rental and collections, Inanageinent,
upkeep, and cleaning (88). Defendants hardly ever
missed a week going fishing during the sum1ner (61)
and left plaintiff alone on those occasions.

During his stay with defendants, plaintiff never
drew his money. He was fed and housed by defendants.
He bought his tobacco and incidentals from money
earned from ice tips (67)/and doing little odd jobs for
neighbors when he had time. In addition, plaintiff earned
money by selling beer bottles and pop bottles that the
tenants left, but quit when defendant Russell insisted
that Shields give Russell the money from the sale of these
bottles ( 71).

Defendants once permitted plaintiff to work unloading rockwool and he earned $50.00 (63). Plaintiff decided to quit defendants once when Russell discovered
plaintiff had this $50.00, and got mad and accused his
wife of having given plaintiff the money. Plaintiff went
up town and rented a room. When he went down to
breakfast the following morning, Mrs. Russell was waiting outside and told him to come back, saying, "If you
don't go back, you won't get your wages" (64-66-108).
Plaintiff returned and worked continuously thereafter
until! he became ill in August, 1949.
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Plaintiff testified he had no need for his $100.00 a
month during the years he was employed (67) and never
made demand upon the defendants, for the reason that
he knew they needed the money to pay for their auto
court which they were buying on time, and plaintiff
thought they would pay him. He didn't need the money.
He was getting old and thought the money would be
available to him when he did need to have some money
(67). There was never any arrangement as to when
his wages were to be paid. Likewise, there was no evidence that he was hired to work for any specified period
of time.
Plaintiff was going to quit once to get better wages.
I-Ie was going to work for contractors building nev-\"
homes on 21st East, but was required to pay $20.00 for
union dues (69), so the Union IIall offered him a job on
the Salt Flats. But defendants talked hi1n out of taking
it because the work would be too hard (70 and 96). He
was going to quit to take a job herding sheep for $125.00
per month, room and board, but the defendants told him
he would have to pay for all sheep losf. Plaintiff believed
them, and so declined the employment (70 & 71).
In August, 1949, plaintiff became sick one night
and threw up about two quarts of blood in an old sink
and on the floor. He was taken to the hospital for seven
days and fed intravenously. The doctor told him he could
go home if Mrs. Russell would fi."'\: what the doctor
ordered him to eat (72). Plaintiff returned home while
defendants were absent, and their son gave him a cabin.
The next morning defendants told him to get out (7:)).
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Plaintiff worked seven days a week except when he
sometime~ took a few days off in the fall to go hunting
with Russell ( 108). He wore com1non clothes, working
clothes which were supplied to him by defendants (108).
He never had a sick day to keep him from working, until
he went to the hospital (109). Sometimes plaintiff got
three meals a day, sometimes he got a sandwich, and
sometimes he got only two meals w}len Mrs. Russell was
busy with her beauty work. Plaintiff bought his own
tobacco from ice tips. Mrs. Russell once gave him $15.00
and $10.00 another time to buy clothes (93). That was all
the money he ever received from defendants., He kept
a record in a book of everything paid him or received
from defendants, but the book disappeared (99-103).
Defendants' counsel showed plaintiff defendants'
proposed "Exhibit 1" dated March 19, 1948, according
to Ted Russell, (188), and listing first the statement,
"Received $82.50 for carpenter work," and signed by R.
L. Shrewsbury, listing second, "Received $82.50 for carpenter work," and supposedly signed by William Shields,
and listing third, "Received $5.00," signed by Williarn
Shields. Plaintiff admitted that the bottom signature
was his, but denied that the signature above it covering
the receipt of $82.50 for carpenter work, was his.
:Mr. Louis Gabardi testified for plaintiff and said
that his home is south of the Russell property. He had
lived there for the last fourteen years, and from his
home he could see the front of Russell's house and part
of their yard, including the two east cabins, and had seen
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plaintiff there from 1943 to 1949. Gabardi testified that
whenever he saw plaintiff, Shields was always busy
working (111), and was often working after sundown.
He saw Shields on the job as early as he, the witness,
got up in the morning. From witness's limited view of
the Russell yard, he had seen plaintiff shoveling snow,
raking leaves, cleaning up, working on a sewer, and
hauling garbage (112).
Mrs. Joseph Kaufman was called by plaintiff and
testified that from 1943 to 1946 or 1947, she had resided
in an apartment in Mr. Gabardi's home. Her view of
Russell's premises was limited to the front of the Russell
home and yard. She saw Shields in and out of the Russell
pre1nises from 1943-1946, and from her limited view, she
saw Shields in and out front working around the front
yard, and at the time; she saw him, he was busy. She
testified she attended :Mrs. Russell's beauty parlor and
that l\1rs. Russell used to do the hair all around there
(116).

Plaintiff called George A. Zee who operated a 18unit motel in Salt Lake City, Utah, operating it from 19-±2
until the present. He·testified that he 1naintained a minimum of two employees during the winter and a minimum
of three employees during the summer to help hun maintain his tourist court. His minimun1 prevailing ·wage
rate from 1943 to 1949 was from $.50 to $.85 an hour
(118). He testified that his pay rate for a general handyman or custodian from 1943 to 1949 was $120.00 per
month for a 48-hour week, plus a room of the value of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

$30.00 per month. On occasion~, he had a person einployed as a si1nple handyman only, doing none of the
duties of changing linens or renting cabins, who received $125.00 per nwnth for a 6 day week, but his hours
varied so that son1e days he worked only 4 hours a day
and son1eti1nes he might work 8 hours a day ( 123).
Plaintiff then rested his case and the heretofore
described n1otion of defendants for nonsuit or dismissal
was made, and granted as to the quantum meruit. Plaintiff's counsel presented authorities to the court in chambers challenging the granting of the nonsuit, which the
court took under advisement, and the defendants proceeded with their case.
George Ungricht, son of 11anila Russell, was called ,
by defendants and testified that from 1943 to 1944 when
he left for the service, Shields took care of the garbage
and was the handJl-nan around the place and helped
Russell with whatever was going on around the place.
On direct examination, the following ensued.

"Q. Did he do the sewer job he testified to
A.

earlier~

"That sewer job was done. But the septic
tank, when the septic tank was put in and
the sewer was laid behind the cabins, it was
when I got a fifteen day leave out of the
Navy. Ted, Bill, and I, all worked on that
sewer, and we put that in during the time I
was on furlough from the Navy" (132).

The witness then testified in rebuttal to plaintiff's
statements, that he had never observed plaintiff left in
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charge of the tourist cabins-that Mr. and Mrs. Carlaw
were left in ·charge from 1946 to 1949 when the witness
returned to the court. He said Mr. Emmett Fletcher
was left in charge when the Russells went to Boston
(134); that plaintiff did not put in over 7 hours a day
working and it did not involve heavy work. The witness
testified that the terms of employment involved board
and room, clothing, and a little spending money because
Shields had told him that in 1941 ( 135). Following 1943,
Mr. Shields had never again made that statement to him
· (135), but he knew that if contrary arrangements had
been made, he would have been informed of them (135).
He didn't know how much money his 1nother gave
Shields, but he knew that she was always giving him
money (136). He estimated that plaintiff smoked a can
of tobacco every two days. IIis n10ther, not Shields,
cleaned the cabins and changed the linen (137).
In addition, he testified his mother took care of the
five rooms the family occupied, did her beauty work;
and cooked three meals a day for them (138). Later the
witness testified that he had helped Shields dig the sewer
line Shields claimed he had dug alone (139), then later
said he and Shields and Russell had dug it (140). Plaintiff watered the lawn, and shoveled snow to clear paths
to the cabins (142), and Shields helped Russell tear down
one cabin that the witness knew of (143). He testified
that Shields helped Russell with the plrunbing and gas
repairs, and tha_t between Mr. Russell and Mr. Shields
. all the work of the 24-cabin motor court was done that
required doing about the premises. They did all the vvork
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
on the ~-1 units and the pre1nises, except change the
linens and keep the cabins clean ( 1-1--1-).
Ted Rn8sell was called as a witness in his own behalf
and testified that he took the plaintiff to the tourist
cabins as a yard man for clearing snow, removing garbage, picking up papers and anything general, in exchange for board and room only (150). Russell was
extensively exan1ined by his counsel concerning the work
for which plaintiff sued in quantum meruit, (153 to
183), 29 pages of testimony on direct examination alone.
Very little of his testimony concerned a denial of plaintiff's alleged express contract and affirmance of the
express contract alleged by defendants.
vVitness was asked (153) as to whether he had
ever left plaintiff in charge of the tourist court and
witness replied that "Shields destruction purposes was
so great, I seen I couldn't give him no responsibility.
I did not give him tools to work with. He would break
them. He broke a couple of lavatories. I had to take
all my dies away. I paid $38.00 for two dies he ruined
for me doing plumbing work and electric work." Russell claimed that as early as September, 1945, he learned
that Shields could not handle implements or act with
any degree of competency in anything higher than manual labor ( 185) and so entrusted only manual labor to
him. However, defendants "Exhibit 1" a receipt whereby defendant tried to prove that he hired Shields to
perform specialized carpenter work and paid him $82.50
per week therefor (157), was dated March, 1948 (188).
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Russell explained he hired Shields as a carpenter and
paid him that kind of money out of sympathy (188).
Russell impeached the testimony of his own witness
and stepson, George Ungricht, who had testified that
Shields dug the sewer trench. Russell denied that Shields
had dug any part of the trench; that plaintiff had done
nothing but move a few rocks out of the path of the
trench (156 and 187).
Russell apparently attempted to prove that plajntiff's later illness was induced by too much smoking
(171), and contrary to Ungricht's testimony that plaintiff smoked a can of tobacco every two days, Russell
testified that Shields sn1oked two cans of tobacco every
day (171). Then to illustrate his generosity toward
plaintiff, Russell testified that when he was back East,
he went to the tobacco dryers in Richmond, Virginia,
and brought back 25 or 26 pounds of dry tobacco leaf
as a gift to Shields and testified this tobacco lasted
plaintiff one week, a result \Vhich would have plaintiff
smoking the equivalent of about 16 cans of tobacco
per day ( 171). When this anomalous result was pointed
out to Russell on cross-examination, he changed his
story and said he had brought back only 8 or 10 pounds,
and that it had taken plaintiff two weeks to smoke it
(197).
Russell claimed he went fishing on Friday nights
and would come back Saturday night or Sunday morning and on those occasions did not leave plaintiff in
charge (160). J\irs. Carlaw was left in charge and
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Emmett Fletcher took charge when there was ~mne
work to be done in the cabins (160). Russell admitted
that he and Shields did all the maintenance work on
the pren1ises, but that Shields' only part therein was
to fetch and carry the tools for Russell (186).
Despite Russell's clain1 that plaintiff was to work
for board and room and nothing more, he testified on
direct exmnination that he gave plaintiff an average of
$1-!3.00 to $1G3.00 a Inonth, including board and room,
clothing, tobacco, and everything (166), and yet, when
asked whether he Inade any individual payments of cash
to the plaintiff over and above tobacco, clothing, etc.,
Russell could only state that during the entire nine
years, he gave the plaintiff $10.00 when ~ir. Shields
was in the hospital (151).'
Of the $1-15.00 to $165.00 per Inonth that Russell
claimed he gave Shields, Russell said about one-half of
that would be board and romn (191), but admitted that
he reported the value of the board and room to the
Social Security Board as being worth only $50.00 per
month (192). Plaintiff claimed that the other one-half,
or $72.50 or $82.50 a month, covered tobacco, clothing,
and cash given to plaintiff, but he would have to go
home to get his receipts and figure out just how to
account for the disbursement of that monthly amount
(194).
Russell admitted that 10 wooden cabins (198) were
torn down and complete new cinder block cabins were
built (198), and on the remaining 14 cabins he installed
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new showers, tile floors, tile baths, new sinks, new electric fixtures, and new plastering therein ( 198-199). He
had screens made and installed in his home, replastered
his home, had new cement front steps put in, sawed
the trees in front of his house and throughout the
premises, and that all of this work was done by outsiders
-none of it by Shields (200). On direct examination,
Mr. Russell produced a number of receipts (Defendants'
"Exhibit 2") to various contractors, supply houses, and
workmen, to indicate that outsiders had necessarily done
all of the work completed on the premises. We submit
that' the total of all such receipts, $2,649.71, could never
approximate the figure Mr. Russell would have had to
pay for all of the foregoing construction, remodeling,
addition, fixtures, and repair if it had all been done by
outsiders.
William Carlaw was called by defendants and testified that George Ungricht was left in charge of the
cabins on the occasions when the Russells were away
( 206). When asked the leading question if 1frs. Carlaw
was left in charge at any time, he said he guessed l\irs.
Carlaw had been left in charge about six or seven times.
When asked what type of work he had observed Mr.
Shields doing the eight years Carlaw observed him at
the court, he testified he saw Shields picking up the
garbage and sweeping around; that he helped Mr. Russell do the plumbing work around the court (209),
helped dig the sewer and helped put in the line (210).
Carlaw testified that he didn't know whether Shields had
ever been placed in charge of the court (209). Carlaw
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stated that the Russells were gone sometimes two or
three days and s01neti1nes a week at a time, but admitted
he had no idea as to how 1nany thnes they had gone
(213).

:J[rs. \Villimn Carlaw was called by defendants and
stated that she was left in charge of the cabins during
the Russell's absence during the last three years. During those times, :Jir. Shields took care of the yard and
was working around taking care of the court, but she
admitted that she didn't know what plaintiff did do
when he went in the cabins (216). She denied that either
:Jlrs. Harper, 1\Irs. Young, or Emmett Fletcher tended
the cabins in the Russells' absence since she took over
in 1946-1947 and 1948 (218).
Emmett Fletcher was called by defendants and
testified that since 1945, he spent two weeks with defendants about twice a year, that he never took care of the
place in the Russells' absence, except to help Mrs. Carlaw
when the Russells were in Boston ( 222).
1\Irs. ~1anila Russell was called and sworn and was
asked by her counsel concerning exactly what work Mr.
Shields did after he reached the auto court. She stated
he gathered up around the yard at all times and did little
duties around the place under Mr. Russell's direction.
She repudiated Mr. Shield's contract claim and asserted
that he was to work for room and board. Outside of
change from groceries that she let plaintiff keep, she
gave him only $10.00 once and only $15.00 once (227).
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She admitted that Shields did a thriving ice business (228). She admitted that Shields wore working
clothes and was out there at all times with Russell working ( 230), and that Shields packed the laundry from
the cabins up to the house ( 232). She testified that
Shields never quit his employment with defendants as
far as she knew ( 234). Shields was around the court 7
days a week, but witness said he did not have to work.
He could do as he pileased ( 237).
Fred Weedon was called by plaintiff as a rebuttal
witness. He was a contractor and built five cabins for
defendants over a year's time, from January 28, 1946,
to March, 1947. IIe was on defendants' premises approximately four months, spread over that period of time.
I-Ie testified that Shields did a limited amount of work
on his payroll and was a fine worker (242). Weedon
testified that plaintiff was busy all of the ti1ne that he
and his men were down there. Shields cleaned up
around, cleaned out the main lavatory every nwrning,
helped do a lot of the plumbing around there, helped
put in the water pipes in the cabins, worked a good deal
with the different crews Russell hired. IIe noticed that
Russell helped plaster one of the cabins (243). Shields
helped lay the floor in one of the cabins and worked
in the cabin where the wooden floor was torn out ( 244) ..
Witness had seen Shields take tourists to their
cabins and take care of the tourist court when the Russells were gone. 1\tfr. Russell went fishing quite often
during the summer ( 245) and stayed two or three days
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at a time. During the period that the Russells were in
Boston, vVeedon saw nobody else but Shields take care
of the tourist court. He showed the people to their
cabins and prepared their cottages and did all of the
rest of the work around the court (245).
He saw Shields dig trenches for the water in each
of the five cabins vVeedon constructed. These trenches
were 18 inches deep and 'Veedon said that Mr. Shields
and Mr. Russell did all of the plumbing for those five
cottages. This did not consist of Mr. Shields simply
carrying the tools around ( 246). Weedon was on defendants' premises from 8 to 4 :30 p.m., and never saw
plaintiff laying around-always doing something-always busy ( 247). \Veedon was to dig- the trench for
gas and water lines up to 3 feet from the foundation
of the cabins. Plaintiff dug the 15 feet from that water
line, under the foundation and over to the far side of
each cabin where the sinks were, about 18 feet per cabin
(207), 18 inches deep (246). Russell and Shields laid
the gas and water lines and did the plumbing to connect
the water line which involved threading pipe, screwing,
it together, etc. (246 and 250). The work plaintiff was
hired by Weedon to do for him consisted of digging the
sewer ditching behind each of the five cabins (247). :Mr.
Weedon testified that during the times he was on the
premises, he observed that Russell was not around there
one-tenth a part of the time that Mr. Shields was (252).

POINT I.
IT WAS PROPER TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE
JURY ON THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT, SINCE
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THE PLEADINGS SET FORTH SEPARATE COUNTS OF
EXPRESS CONTRACT AND QUANTUM 1>/IERUIT, AND THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED WAS CONFLICTING AND COULD
SUPPORT EITHER COUNT, AND IT WAS FOR THE JURY
TO DETERMINE WHICH COUNT WAS PROVEN.

The amended complaint in the first cause of action
alleges an express agreement that plaintiff was to work
at defendants' 22-cabin tourist court n1aking beds,
sweeping and mopping floors, painting cabins, tearing
down old cabins, building forms for new cabins, performing all plumbing and gas repairs, shoveling snow,
watering lawns, removing garbage, and all other general handiwork about the premises for the sum of $100.00
per month and romn and board (1). Defendants in their
amended answer denied such express contract and set
forth an express agreement whereby they employed
plaintiff as watchman and occasional handy man only
around the tourist court for room and board only without cash payment or settlement of any kind or nature
beyond said room and board (3). Plaintiff's amended
complaint set forth a second cause of action, that plaintiff performed services for defendants at their special
instance and request between June, 1943, and August,
1949, of the reasonable value of $150.00 per month (1),
and admitted the receipt of board and room during said
period as part payment (2).
There is no question but that plaintiff was entitled
to plead different counts in order to meet the exigencies
of the case as presented by the evidence. Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule S(E) 2 specifically permits the
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pleading of 1nultiple and inconsistent clain1s. Said rule
provides:

"* * * A party n1ay also state as many separate clain1s or defenses as he has regardless of
inconsistency or whether based on legal or equitable grounds or on both."
The plaintiff was entitled to instructions on both
counts, express contract and quantum meruit, it being
for the jury to decide what plaintiff had proved under
all the evidence. It appeared from the evidence that
plaintiff nright have proved all of the work he was supposed to perform for $100.00 per month. Yet, the jury
may have determined that he did not fulfill all of the
obligations required to be performed for $100.00 per
month. Defendants claimed an express contract that
plaintiff was to be the watchman and occasional handy
man only in exchange for room and board alone. However, by defendants' own testimony and the testimony
of all of the witnesses introduced in their behalf, it was
obvious that plaintiff had performed work of a nature
and extent far greater than what he was to perfonn
for room and board alone. Obviously he was entitled
to compensation for the excess. It was for the jury to
determine which of the two express contracts, if either,
was substantiated by the evidence. If they found against
both claimed express contracts, then they could properly
find and award the reasonable value of the services they
determined plaintiff performed. Thus Instructions 4, 5,
and 8, excepted to by defendants and concerning the
implied contract of employment, were proper. As 'a
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matter of fact under the evidence as it stood at the
' instructed, under Rule 54 (c) (1), the
time the jury was
court had a duty to instruct the jury as to whether
plaintiff rendered any services to defendants under an
implied contract and, if he did, that defendants should
pay the reasonable value of such work and labor rendered by plaintiff. Rule 54(c) (1) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
"Every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for
or against one or more of several claimants; and
it may, when the justice of the court requires it,
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on
each side as between or among themselves."
In view of the foregoing rule now prevailing m
our jurisdiction, we feel that the l\fichigan cases and
some few other cases cited in appellants' brief holding
that where an express contract is sued on, recovery on
the theory of quantum meruit is not obtainable or not
applicable, are superseded. We feel that the Utah
Supreme Court gave efficacy to the present rule cited
when it decided the case of Young v. Hanson (Utah, }.1ay,
1950), 218 Pac. 2d 666, cited in appellants' brief, where
the court permitted a recovery on the theory of quantum
meruit, even though there had been no pleading of
quantum meruit. The new Rules of Civil Procedure
attempt to do full and complete justice between the
parties in one suit, as adduced by the evidence, whether
such relief is sought by the pleadings or not.
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Further, in spite of appellants' limited support of
the Yiew that where an express contract is sued on,
recoyery on the theory of quanhun meruit is not obtainable, BancToft on Code Pleading, Vol. 1, Sec. 106 to 110,
announces the "well-settled rule that causes of action
arising frmn contracts, express or implied, may be
united. For exan1ple, a claim upon an express contract
and a claim upon quanhun 1neruit may be united."
BancToft in Sec. 108 says:
"It is now clearly settled by the weight of
authority that a count upon a quantum meruit
may be joined with one upon a special contract,
although each states only a separate ground for
substantially the same recovery. This may often
be necessary and is allowed for the purpose of
meeting the exigencies of the proof. There is,
under the code practice, no legal incompatibility
in declaring separately upon the two causes of
action. They need not correspond or be consistent with each other. As illustrative of the
rule just stated, it is proper to bring a count for
the reasonable value of services with a count
based upon an express contract to pay a stated
commission or salary,"
citing nun1erous cases from Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Washington, VVisconsin,
Missouri, Ohio, and New York in support of this principle.
BancToft's Code Pleading, Vol. 1, Section 705, speaks
on the variance between a quantum meruit count and
proof of express contract, where only one cause of action
has been pleaded.
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"Under certain authorities, it is the rule that
a party declaring upon an express contract cannot recover on an implied contract or on a quantum meruit. In other states, however, it is the
settled law that where the complaint alleges a
special contract only and the proof fails to establish it, but does in fact show the rendition of
services, a recovery may be had upon quantum
meruit,"
citing many cases from Montana, Nevada, New York,
Washington, and Wyoming in support. Our new code
provision, 54( c) (1), would permit such a recovery.
Appellants at p. 17 of their brief state that the
plaintiff had performed his contract Jn full and there
remained only for him to recover the money constituting
performance on the part of the appellants. Appellants
claim this is not a proper action on quantum meruit, but
must be an action on the contract which was pleaded
and proved and admitted by the appellants, but with a
difference of opinion as to what the rate of pay was.
Bancroft on Code Pleading, Section 706, continues:
"It is, however, a general rule that where a
contract has been fully performed by the plaintiff and nothing re1nains to be done but the payment of the money by the defendant, the liability
of the defendant may be enforced under a count
for the reasonable value of the services; in such
case, the contract may be used as evidence, the
effect of such proof being to make the stipulated
compensation the quantum meruit in the case,"
citing n,umerous cases in support of this principle from
California, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon.
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POINT II.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED WHEN
THE COURT VACATED ITS JUDGMENT OF INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL MADE FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE, SINCE APPELLANTS HAD BEEN
APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STRICKEN
COUNT MIGHT BE REINSTATED AND PROJECTED THEIR
DEFENSE BASED ON THAT CONTINGENCY, AND THEMSELVES ADDUCED EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS THAT THE
STRICKEN QUANTUM MERUIT COUNT WAS OPERATIVE.

As related by appellants, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, appellants moved for a nonsuit or dismissal of the plaintiff's case for the reason that plaintiff had
not sustained the proof of the elements that go to make
up the cause of action stated in the amended complaint,
particularly as to the first count covering the express
contract. The court granted a nonsuit as to the quantum
meruit.
Plaintiff and his witnesses had testified to the kind
and extent of services plaintiff had performed. Plaintiff
called 1\:fr. George A. Zee as a witness. Mr. Zee operated
an 18-unit motel in Salt Lake City during the years
plaintiff had worked for defendants at their motel in Salt
Lake City. Mr. Zee (117 to 124) testified as to the wages
he paid his employees doing work of a comparable nature
as plaintiff during the period of time sued on by plaintiff. On re-cross-examination (124), Mr. Zee acknowledged that his testimony concerning wages and labor
was confined to the experience in his own court and admitted that he was not acquainted with the same situation
generally throughout the tourist courts in the city.

~,
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Following Mr. Zee's testi1nony, plaintiff rested and
defendants made the motion for nonsuit or dismissal.
The court felt that Mr. Zee was called as an expert witness and. had failed to prove the prevailing wage for
services similar to plaintiff's in Salt Lake City during
the pertinent period of time, and therefore, apparently
felt that plaintiff had failed in a necessary element of
proof of the reasonable value of the services under the
quantum meruit cause of action. The Court granted
the motion as to the quantum meruit count, although
the court (125) had previously overruled defendants'
motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Zee on the grounds
that it was not probative, the court stating that the motion was not timely 1nade. The court said if plaintiff
had a qualified witness and wanted to reopen for that
purpose, it would allow plaintiff so to do, but then refused plaintiff ti1ne in which to produce such witness
(127). The court then informed defendants' counsel he
could limit his proof to n1atters under the express contracts, and court recessed for the day. The following
morning in chambers and in the presence of defendants'
counsel, plaintiff contested the court's granting of the
nonsuit and produced authorities:
20 Am. J ur., Sec. 386, Page 349: "In an action to recover the value of services rendered
under an implied contract, evidence of what
others received for like services 1nay be properly
considered and, in the last analysis, is the proper
criterion."
58 Am. Jur., Sec. 63, Page 560: "The jury
may from ·their knowledge of business and the
value of the labor, in assumpsit for work and
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labor, find a verdict for the value of the work
done upon request without an express contract,
notwithstanding there is no evidence of the worth
of labor at the tiine and place the work was performed."
The court thereupon infor1ned counsel for plaintiff
and defendant that he would take the authorities and
the matter under advisement and permitted the trial to
proceed.
Defendant proceeded with his evidence and in effect
completely disregarded the court's original advice that
he could limit his defense to matters under the express
contract. Appellants complain that they were prejudiced
when the court at the conclusion of defendants' case
reinstated the quantum meruit count, claiming they had
no opportunity to try their case and meet the proof required if the quantum meruit count had been in effect.
Their complaint of prejudice is not consistent with the
facts. Defendants proceeded to introduce witness after
witness and each witness was examined under direct
examination concerning the character and nature and
extent of the work plaintiff performed, to establish
that work plaintiff actually perform8d and to rebut the
evidence of the work plaintiff claimed he did. Plaintiff
made no objection whatsoever to the ~ntroduction of this
whole line of testimony which served to rebut plaintiff's
evidence. Defendants tried their case as if the quantum
meruit had never been stricken. Their defense was in
no way limited to whether or not express contract was
the only issue, and the record so shows.
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As the best and most convincing proof of that fact,
the record clearly shows (255) that defendants had
throughout their defense conducted their case as if the
quantum meruit had never been expunged, for at the
conclusion of defendants' case, the following took place
(255): Defendants moved the court to direct a verdict
in favor of the defendants upon the issttes raised in the
pleadings, for the following reasons:
"FIRST: (Defendants, contending the Statute of
Limitations had run, requested a directed verdict as to
all matters prior to February 23, 1946.)"
"SECONDLY: That the plaintiff has a failure of
their proof in this particular case, particularly as to the
quantum_ meruit question on work and labor performed
at the specific instance and request of the defendants."
So, beyond a doubt, defendants cannot claim prejudicial error where it is obvious they projected a full and
complete defense to both causes of action, and did so
consciously, believing that the court was apt to reinstate
the quantum meruit.
Following defendants' 1notion for directed verdict,
which the Court took under advisement (225), plaintiff
moved that the second cause of action theretofore
stricken be reinstated, and the court granted this motion.
If appellants would claim error, it appears that it then
became incumbent upon them to ask the court to permit
them to reopen to introduce evidence in defense of that
cause of action, if they felt they were prejudiced in anv
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way. Defendants and their witnesses were still present.
But defendants, knowing full well that such a request
was sterile and that they could produce only redundant
and repetitious evidence, having already fully covered
their defense to the quanhun meruit count, when the
court asked, .. Anything further'?", ~Ir. Burnham answered, "That is all." (255)

In addition, the court had a duty to reverse its
ruling on the nonsuit of the quantum meruit, for, under
Rule 61 of the lTtah Code of Civil Procedure:
"No error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court ...
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice."
We submit that for the court to have refused to
reverse itself would have been inconsistent with substantial justice, under both the law, under which the
court should never have granted a nonsuit in the first
instance, and under the evidence, where the defendants
themselves undertook a defense to the quantum meruit
count by rebuttal and positive exposition of what plaintiff actually performed, and themselves made out a case
supporting quantum meruit recovery by plaintiff.
We will not here undertake a duplication of the evidence which we have heretofore summarized in our statement of facts, other than by recapitulation. Defendants'
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law, Mrs. Carlaw, and l\{rs. Manila Russell, on direct
examination were all examined at length concerning the
type and extent of the service performed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff made no objection to the introduction of this
testimony, although it was all in rebuttal of plaintiff's evidence.
We submit that under the evidence defendants introduced, defendants made out a case of quantum meruit
for plaintiff and it was mandatory on the court, under
Rule 54 (c) (1), to give the jury an ir.struction on quantum meruit, whether the court ever reinstated the
stricken quantum meruit cause of action or not. On
U ngricht's testimony alone, Where he testified that
• Shields and Russell together did all of the work required
of 24 cabins and the premises, exclusive of cleaning the
cabins and the changing of linens, the court had a duty
to instruct the jury on quantum 1neruit recovery, the new
code provision permitting a party to all the recovery
to which he is entitled from the evidence, whether
pleaded or not.
1

In Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 39 Ut. 580 and Tintic
Standard Mining Co. v. Utah Cotmty, 80 rt. 491, cited by
appellants, the question here involved was not raised.
There, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case in each instance, nonsuits were granted, and nothing further was
done. Obviously, the court in these instances had nothing
further to do than enter judgments of dismissal.
I

In all events, the error claimed by defendants has
not been prejudicial, the record showing that defendants
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offered all their proof on the issue of quantum meruit
and conducted their defense and n1ade their motion for
directed verdict on the theory that the quantum meruit
cause of action was never stricken.

POINT III
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR
TO FEBRUARY 23, 1946, THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR WORK AND LABOR PERFORMED, FOR THE
REASON THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD
NOT COMMENCED TO RUN, PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT
HAVING BEEN A CONTINUOUS ONE.

Appelants cited a Utah case in anticipation of an
argument by respondent that the matter sued on is an
open account, Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 Pac.
2d 180, wherein the Utah court construed Section 104-223, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, by quoting frmn a
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Spencer v.
Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234 Pac. 972, at Page 973, 39 ALR
365, concern,ing the definition of an open account. The
Utah case concerned a claim for services by an attorney
against a corporation and rendered over a 10 year period.
After the court set forth the Spencer v. Sowers definition
of open account, quoted in appellants' brief at P. 22, our
court denied the claim, stating as follows: "The account
drifted on for ten years without payment or credit. The
evidence tends rather to show that each item if not constituting a separate employment, was susceptible of that
interpretation." (Claimant had admitted he was not
employed on a general retainer basi.s). The court stated
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that a series of charges for ttnrelated items, except that
they were related to the same party against the other
with no credits or counter-charges, did not constitute
an open account contemplated by the statute.
In support of the Bishop v. Parker case, appellants
cite Spencer v. Sowers, supra, where three separate, independent, and wholly unrelated loans of money were
made at separate intervals of time and no payments on
account were made, nor was any acknowledgement thereof in writing made by the borrower. This was held not
to be an open account, and we agree with the court's
holding under such facts, but those are not the facts of
the case at bar.
It is our contention as supported by the evidence
( 99 & 108 concerning book account kept by plaintiff of
amounts received) that payment on account tolls the
statute of limitations, even were the statute of limitations otherwise applicable in the case at bar. There is
an annotation in 36 A.L.R., particularly at Page 350, in
point. The annotation says:
"In Sn1ith v. Velie, 60 NY 106, in which the
intestate let the plaintiff have every year various
sums of money and different articles of goods, of
which he kept an account against her which was to
apply upon her wages, the court says : ''Vhenever
he did this, her services being continuous and no
time fixed by agreen1ent for the payrnent of any
part, the presumption is that it was to "apply upon the balance he at that tiine owed her, and not
upon the wages of any particular year * * · * The
payment by the intestate upon the balance due the
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clailnant took the entire balance out of the operation of the statute.' In Pursell v. Fry, 19 Hun
(NY) 595, 58 How. Pr. 317, an action against an
estate on an account for services, the court says
* * * that paYJ.nent by the intestate upon the balance due took the entire balance out of the operation of the statute.
To sum up, the paYJ.nent operates not because
it is an item of an account, but by virtue of an
independent principle that a payment tolls the
statute of lilnitations. This principle operates
whether the payment is on an account, or on a
note or other debt."
In the case at bar, the defendants allege their express contract to be for board and room and no cash
payment nor settlement of any kind or nature. Plaintiff's pleadings and evidence admitted, and defendants
themselves testified, that cash and clothing were paid to
plaintiff, which we submit were payments on account
which tolled the statute of limitations, if such were applicable. However, we cannot overlook the implication
of the Utah case, Bishop v. Parker, supra, as well as the
positive holding of the Gulbrandson v. Thompson case
hereinafter cited, that the statute of limitations in this
case cannot and would not be applicable.
It is possibly superfluous even to consider appellants' third point relied on concerning the statute of
limitations for the reason that the court cannot speculate
as to which theory or theories the jury employed to permit recovery. There are unlimited possibilities as to
how the jury determined its verdict, and if quantum
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meruit was their basis, the statute of limitations could
be inapplicable, for who knows how n1uch and for which
period of time the jury gave verdict.
Ted Russell alleged plaintiff quit and came back in
1946 (161). The verdict could have represented the
reasonable value of the services plaintiff performed
after 1946. It may have represented recovery under
plaintiff's express contract for a period of time less than
the whole, if the jury felt he may have quit. The jury
may well have founded part of their verdict on plaintiff's
express contract and felt that a different contract of
hiring arose following the quitting and rehiring. They
1nay have turned plaintiff down entirely on his claimed
express contract if they felt he had not performed all of
the services required for $100.00 per -n1onth plus room
and board, and then have awarded hin1 the reasonable
value for the services he did perform. They may have
disbelieved plaintiff's express contract and believed defendants' express contract, but yet have found that plaintiff performed services in excess of the limited duties
defendants' express contract of hiring called for, and
given plaintiff a verdict for the reasonable value of the
services performed over and above defendants' claimed
express contract.
The possibilities upon which the jury predicated its
verdict are innumerable, and it is not for the court to
speculate as to what was in the jury's mind. In the absence of any special interrogatories which would have
shed some illumination, the judgment must be upheld
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if there is a legal foundation for upholding any theory
under which the jury nwy have arrived at its verdict.
Appellants claim to have analyzed a nu1nber of
cases in which suit was brought for a claim rendered
against an estate for personal services rendered over a
long period of time and in which an application of a
statute of limitations was made, citing first the case of
McFeeters r. Cecil, 177 Okla. 454, 60 Pac. 2d 801, allegedly in support of their position. The case as they recite was an action for services rendered for 13 years at
$100 per year and for an additional 8 years at $250 per
year. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's
right was limited to recovery within 3 years (Okla. statute of limitations) next preceding commencement of suit.
However, the facts in the McFeeters case do not coincide
·with ours in any respect. The case states:
"The trial court held that the evidence does
not show a single hiring for the continuous performance of the work and services during the
period of years involved. The record bears out
the holding, as the evidence shows many intervals
in which no service was rendered by the plaintiff,
and particularly was this true as pointed out by
the trial court when the same services or substantially the same were rendered by another.
Also it was true in the year 1917, when plaintiff
was away and lived for some time in eastern Oklahoma."
As appellants recite, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found that cases on the general subject fell into three
factual categories, one of which is directly in point and
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the law thereon stated affirms our position. The court
said:
"In Kansas, Grisham v. Lee, 61 ICan. 533, GO
Pac. 312, and Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Cal. App. 178, 188 Pac. 1034,. the.
following rule is applied: 'If there is a single
hiring and the term of service of the employee and
also the time when his compensation shall become
due, are not fixed by agreement or understanding, and the hiring and service continue without
interruption or payment until the death of the
employer, the employment, in the absence of evidence of a general custom or usage, may be
deemed continuous, and the statute of limitations
will not begin to run against a claim for compensation until the services are ended.'
"This rule has been followed in other cases
in Kansas and California and in Gulbranson v.
Thompson, 63 U t. 115, 222 Pac. 590, * * * and
in other states. But in aH thm~e cases, there \vas
but a single hiring and the services were ccmtinuons, or substantially so."
Then the Supreme Court went on to state that the rule
in Grisham v. Lee, etc., was not applicable under the
facts of the Oklahoma case, since there was no evidence
of a single hiring and the services were intermittent.
Our case falls squarely within the rule announced
in the McFeeters case, since the evidence showed that
plaintiff's services were perforn1ed under general hiring
without any express agreement as to the time of compensation or the term of e1nployment and there was a
single hiring and the services continued for a series of
years without interruption or substantial payment.
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.:\..t p. 27 of appellant's brief they state, and we submit improperly so, that the courts hold generally that
where a contract for personal services is indefinite or
uncertain as to the rate of compensation for the period
to be covered by a specific amount of compensation, the
statute of limitations is held to bar claim for con1pensation for the services after the statutory period has run,
and cite several cases thereafter. One such case cited,
1llcConnell L Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 SE 2d 673, says:
"The cited decisions from this court and those
from No. Carolina and Virginia which reflect the
rule that the statute of limitations applies to
claims for services to a decedent which were rendered without agreement that payment should be
made at death or by will, appear to be out of line
with many other courts, possibly the majority
(italics ours) but we do not think that we should
in this case depart from our rule, under which
the alleged services were rendered in this case.
The right, if any, arose under that law and should
be confirmed by it. Numerous cases are collected
which illustrate the conflicting views in other
jurisdictions in 7 ALR 2d 198."
Another case cited therein by appellants is In re
McCormick Estate, 8 NYS 2d 179. This case is not even
in point for the reason that the claim in said case was
barred because not filed within the pertinent statute of
·limitation of the probate code.
The rule and the proper one is set forth in 56 Am.
Jur. p. 556:
"Where a claim for work, labor, or services
performed is based upon distinct contracts for the
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items specified, it would seem that the statute of
limitations would commence to run as to those
items represented by each contract. But where
the matters specified in the claim are the outgrowth of entire contract for continuous labor
or services, the demand will be considered as an
entire one and the statute will not attach until
the completion of the contract. Where services
are rendered under a contract of employment
which does not fix the term of service or the time
for payment, the contract is continuous and the
statute of limitations does not commence to run
until the employee's services are terminated," citing in footnote 15, p. 556, cases in support from
U. S., Georgia, Iowa, Ky., Mass., Orego'n, Washington, West Virginia, Nebraska, and RCL.
The case of Re Baker, 144 Neb. 797, annotated in
155 A.L.R. 950, states a sin1ilar rule citing:
Phifer v. Estate of Phifer, Neb., 199 N.vV.
511; In re Estate of Skade, Neb., 283 N.\V. 8fi1;
Fiar1non v. Smitch, Ind., 157 N.E. 284."
Appellants' contention concerning the statute of
lin1itations is squarely met and blocked by the Utah case
of Gulbrandson v. Thompson, supra, which oddly enough,
they profess 1n support of their position. Recovery therein was upheld, according to appellants, because of an
agreement that claimant would care for her ailing mother
until death, so that, according to appellants, no action
could have been brought until such certain specified time
had been reached. Those facts as recited by appellants
could not be further from the truth. The Gulbrandson
case, in light of the facts, is absolutely in point with the
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case at bar and holds ~qnarely again~t the appellants.
They have perverted the facts and represent that there
was an agree1nent for the elai1nant to care for her 1nother
until death. There is not one iota of fact in the case to
support such a state1nent.
The court recites these facts: plaintiff's mother was
afflicted with an ailment which, while intermittent,
could and thereafter did recur from time to time. Plaintiff had gone to California upon attaining her majority
and was earning a fair living there. She came home and
commenced to care for her mother and cared for her
whenever the ailment became acute or active, and it developed over a period of years that her services were
fairly continuous because of the frequency of her
mother's attacks. The court found her services to be
continuous from 1908 until the mother's death in 1922,
despite a 6 months' intermission from December, 1915,
until ~Iay, 1916, which the court considered a temporary
intermission and not a cessation. The court said:

"Under these facts, the services could not
have been considered otherwise than continuous
so far as the statute of limitations is concerned
* * * She must be allowed compensation for the
full period of time during which she rendered
such services."
As pointed out, no mention whatsoever is made of any
agreement to perform services until a specified period,
that is, until the mother's death.
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The Gulbrandson case is identical with the case at
bar it has never been overruled in Utah, and it is in
'
agreement
with the controlling majority view in the
United States. It is therefore pointless to argue further
the applicability of the statute of limitations to this case.
As a matter of fact, the Gulbrandson case is cited in 37
Corpus Juris sec. 175, footnote 41 at p. 824, together with
Grisham v. Lee, supra, Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust
Bank, supra, and other cases from Indiana, Iowa, l{ansas, Michigan, Mississippi and Washington, in support
of the premise that the contract of employment is a
continuing. one, and that the employee's right of action
accrues and the statute begins to run when and only
when the services are fully perforn1ed or the en1ploy1nent
otherwise terminated.
We feel it unnecessary to answer appellant's contention that appellants were prejudiced through submitting the case to the jury for the entire period, since the
v~rdict was $200 in excess of the maximum allowance of
$100 per n1onth during the period not barred hy the
statute of lin1itations (under their contention), inasmuch
as there is nothing to indicate but that this verdict was
rendered on a quantum n1eruit basis during the period
of time in which they admit the claim was alive.
POINT IV
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY
AND PRESUMED INSANITY, FOR THE REASON THAT
THERE WAS NO VALID ADJUDICATION OF PLAINTIFF'S
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INSANITY IN EXISTENCE, AND THE SO-CALLED EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED AND THE OBJECTION WAS NOT TIMELY MADE .

..:\ ppellants claiin error because their J\fotion for a
Kew Trial on the basis, anwng other things, of newly
discoyered eYidence concerning plaintiff's insanity, was
denied. Briefly, there is no doubt that the trial judge
acted well within the discretion permitted him to deny
such n1otion, if he determined from the evidence presented hi1n that inforn1ation concerning plaintiff's sanity
or lack thereof was not ne·wly discovered evidence.
Among such evidence presented to him for consideration was this: plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit in
objection to defendants' said ~lotion for New Trial (S-8)
setting forth that defendants' counsel, during the trial
of said cause, confronted plaintiff's counsel with information concerning plaintiff's incarceration in an
Oregon asylum. The affidavit stated further that defendants under oath at the trial admitted that they knew
plaintiff had come from Oregon in 1941, and that for
nine years thereafter had lived with them continuously
and had taken all his meals with them and had been "one
of the family." Those facts in said affidavit were never
controverted by defendants in the presentation of their
motion, leaving no doubt that the trial judge could
properly have found that defendants' evidence was not
newly discovered.
It appears to the writer that whichever horn of their
dilemma appellants seek to grasp, their position is not
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tiff might have been presented to the jury as insane and
incompetent, how could they overcome having lived with
him intimately nine years and never having a suspicion
concerning his sanity. On the other horn, if his insanity
existed and was of such palpable nature as to affect the
outcome of .their case, then they had a duty to raise the
objection in timely fashion as required by law. In that
respect (even if the Utah court were required to give
full faith and credit to a foreign insanity adjudication
if such existed at the time of trial), Bancroft on Code
Pleading at p. 332 states the following:
"Incapacity of plaintiff to sue is a ground
of special demurrer. The want of capacity to sue
which is apparent on the face of con1plaint must
be taken by demurrer," citing among other cases
Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Eli,te Candy Co.,
47 Ut. 1, 168 Pac. 427. "If the objection does not
so appear, it must be taken by answer," (citing
the Tooele case) "and if it is not raised by either
1nethod, it is waived" (citing again the Tooele
case among others).
In Blumauer v. Clock, Washington, G4 Pac. 8-±-t,
plaintiff minors in their own names sued to foreclose
a mechanic's lien. The objection that the minors had
undertaken to sue in their own names without the intervention of a guardia:q was not raised until after the trial.
IIeld: "After pleading to the merits, the objection cannot be raised, for the defendant is deemed to have thereby admitted that plaintiff is rectus in curia. 14 Enc. Pl. &
Proc., 1019 and cases cited."
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In Tooele Llleat v. Eite Candy, supra, judgment hy
plaintiff was affinned on appeal. Plaintiff in error
sought to set aside the judgn1ent on the ground of fraud,
alleging that plaintiff fraudulently alleged in its original
complaint that it was a corporation of the State of Utah
when there did not and had not existed any such corporation. The court said:
"There is still another reason 'vhy this appeal
must fail. The objection that the plaintiff has
not legal capacity to sue, or to maintain or prosecute an action is one that, under all of the codes,
must be taken at the proper time and in the
proper manner or it will be deemed waived. Such
an objection is like one that the plaintiff is not
the real party in interest. That objection must
be taken by special demurrer if it appears on
the face of the complaint, and, if it does not so
appear, then advantage of it must be taken by
answer, and if not taken either by answer or
demurrer the objection is waived. The objection
of want of legal capacity to sue is also waived
lmless made either by answer or demurrer," citing
a long list of cases.
·
"A judg1nent, however, in an action in which
the plaintiff did not have the legal capacity to sue
or to prosecute the same is not void, and, as we
have seen, is a matter that may be waived, and,
under all the authorities, unless the objection is
made at the proper tin1e and in the proper manner is waived. The plaintiff, not having made the
objection in the former action, it has waived its
right to interpose the same in this action * * *
Again, even though it were conceded that the
judgment in the former action was obtained
through a misstatement of the facts respecting
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the legal capacity to sue, yet that standing alone,
would not be sufficient cause to set aside the
judgment in this case. The rule in that regard
is well and correctly stated in 15 RCL sec. 215,
pp. 762-764 inc."
Thus, even if appellants are to say that because of their
ignorance of the facts upon which they could have raised
a timely objection, that they should be allowed to raise
the objection now, their position is untenable under the
ruling of our Supreme Court above, where the plaintiffs
in error not only claimed ignorance of the true facts, but
set forth grounds of actual fraud and misrepresentation
on the part of the plaintiff which later caught them by
surprise.
;;;

Also, in San Luis Obispo County v. Simas, 34 ALR
224:
"It was unsuccessfully urged upon appeal
from a judgment in eminent domain proceedings
that the court erred in signing the findings and
judgment after counsel for the defendant owner
of the property condemned, had requested time
within which to make proof of such owner's insanity, the court stating that the cause had heen
tried and submitted and verdict returned, and the
rights of the parties were to be determined as
they existed at the time of such submission."
Appellants set forth in their brief the varying and
conflicting authorities as to the effect of a rendition of
a sanity adjudication in another state. To hold with
appellants in accordance with the authorities most favorable to them-that an Oregon adjudication should be
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giYen full faith and credit-is of no help to them, for
the reason that there was no binding adjudication in
Oregon in existence at the tin1e of this trial. The amended
complaint herein was filed February 10, 1950, and trial
'vas connnenced ~\pril ~7, 1950. Appellant's affidavit
of Dr. Donald \Yair, Supt. of the Eastern Oregon State
Hospital (26) shows that plaintiff escaped frmn said
institution on August 11, 1941, was absent continually
thereafter and was discharged fron1 said hospital on
Feb. 21, 1950, just 11 days after the commencement of
this suit and more than two months before the trial of
this cause. Plaintiff was discharged from the institution and his guardianship immediately thereafter terminated. So there is no merit to appellants' claim that
Utah must recognize a foreign insanity adjudication, for
none such existed when plaintiff was produced as a witness and as a party plaintiff, thus killing appellants'
contention that plaintiff had no power or capacity to
commence this action because of Sec. 104-3-6, DCA 1943.
Furthermore, such statutes requiring that an infant
or insane or incompetent person who is a party must
appear by guardian, are held to be procedural only, not
jurisdictional, and not mandatory in any sense, for the
reason that such statutes are designed to protect the
interests of the incompetent, rather than from the standpoint of capacity to institute :; suit.
There is a lengthy annotation in 140 ALR at page
1336, "Mental Incompetency at Time of Rendition of
Judgment in Civil Action as Ground of Attack on it."
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Generally, the annotation iterates the accepted rule that
a judgment rendered against an incompetent who appears for himself without guardian or next friend, is not
void but rnerely voidable upon proof of rather stringent
requirements which must be found in favor of the incompetent. When such a harsh rule is maintained in
favor of upholding a judgment against an incompetent
who appears improperly, how then can the court upset
a judgment in favor of an incompetent who appeared
improperly and could only have harmed himself by his
defects. The accepted rule as laid down in the cited
annotation is further repeated in a lengthy annotation
in 34 ALR at page 221.
As hereinafter stated, the word "must" is not considered as mandatory, and the annotation in 140 ALR
1336 recites as follows, quoting from the case of Backley
National Bank v. Boone, 1940-CCA 4th, 115 F 2d 513:
"The rule that a judgment against an insane
person not represented by a guardian or committee will not be set aside, even upon direct attack, unless a meritorious defense to the action is
shown, applies even in states where it is provided
by statute that in a suit against an insane person
a guardian ad litem for the defendant must be
appointed, since such requirement is procedural
and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."
The annotation further cites, Home Life Insurance
v. Cohen, 1936-278 Mich. 169, 270 NW 256:
"Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for an
insane defendant under a Statute providing that,
after service of process, the action shall not be
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further prosecuted until the appoinbnent of such
a guardian, renders the judg1nent against such
defendant n1erely voidable, since such statute is
procedural only."
\Yhere the plaintiff was Insane and appeared h:';
hin1self without guardian or next friend as required hy
statute to do, just as in the instant case, courts have held
that the plaintiff was properly before the court and
have allowed the judgn1ent to stand after the defect was
pointed out. K o leniency was shown even to such incompetents who had, by Yirtue of their very incompetency, waived the rights enacted for their benefit. 34 ALR
at page 22-! declares this result under circumstances
where the incompetent alone appears as plaintiff, and
no conflicting authorities are found therein. \Ve cite
therefrom particularly two cases :
"In Hubbard v. \Villiams, 14-! Ga. 566, 87 SE
780, the court dismissed a petition to set aside
a judgment rendered against an idiot in an action
instituted by her without a guardian, where it appeared that the action was brought by the idiot
and two plaintiffs to enjoin a process direqted
against all of them."
"In Leonard v. The Times, 51 Ill. App. 427,
where it appeared that, after the commencement
of an action, the plaintiff was adjudged to be
temporarily insane and confined to an asylum at
the time of the dismissal of the action for want of
prosecution and, after regaining his liberty,
moved to set aside the order of dismissal, the
court held that the fact of his insanity and confinement at the time of the dismissal afforded no
ground for relief."
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These cases are even more dmnning against appellants than a similar result (which is what we pray for)
would be to us, since these plaintiffs were unfortunate~y
incompetent and unprotected from the inception of suit
right through adjudication of the cases on the merits.
The decisions aforesaid expressly reject a contention
much stronger than appellants' contention (that the
judgment should be set aside, or a new trial granted)
because of failure merely to commence plaintiff's action
by guardian.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, we feel the
lower court properly denied defendants' motion on such
ground. Sec. 104-2-37, UCA 1943, expressly allows an
incompetent to maintain this action within one year after
his disability is removed, and certainly appellants were
not prejudiced in any way by the n1ere preiTlature filing
of this action when it was brought to fruition within a
period expressly reserved to plaintiff for this very type
of action.
However, since the evidence projected as a basis
for new trial was not newly discovered and there was no
Oregon adjudication in existence, and the motion was
properly denied, it besomes unnecessary for the court
to pass upon the effect of an adjudication of insanity
rendered by a sister state, but in passing we cite that the
better rule would be in line with the authorities holding
that such an adjudication is not binding and will not
be recognized at all in other states, and that to establish
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by, there n1nst be nn independent inquisition. The views
of the yarying dPrisions are set forth in ~S A1n. J ur. Sec.
23, and the language of this section is cmnpletely annotated in 102 ALR cmn1nenring at p. -l--l--1-. The annotation
says:
"Insanity is not a status. If insanity is found
at the don1irile, it does not affect the condition
of the person in another state; if he is to be
treated as insane in the other state, he must there
be found insane," citing Re Jones, 1935, N.D., 263
X\Y 160; Cates v. Bingham, -19 Conn. 875; H otchkiss v. illiddlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S.E. 36, 43
L.R.A. 806.
•' A theory sometimes advanced against the
conclusive recognition (of such adjudication) is
that from its very nature it is intended to be not
permanent or immutable, but subject to change
both in the state where it is rendered and in other
states, as in the course of nature changes in the
mental condition of the person in question may
warrant or require," citing McNeill v. Harlow,
81 Fla. 401, 88 So. 127.
Because there was no valid existing adjudication
of plaintiff's insanity at the time of his trial, appellant's
complaint at p. 31 of their brief that plaintiff could not
be a witness under Sec. 104-49-2 (1), UCA 1943, likewise
fails.
Appellant's next argument that if plaintiff was insane, his contracts, including the contract sued upon in
this case, would have been void, 28 Am. Jur. p. 695, is
unsound, for even an insane person is entitled to compensation for his labors under quantum meruit.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants had a full and fair trial on the m~rits
of both causes of action pleaded and proved by plaintiff, and lost. The jnry awarded plaintiff a verdict
which amounted to about $60.00 per n1onth plus board
and room for six years. A motion for new trial was
heard by the trial judge, and he acted properly within
the discretion given him in denying it. Thereafter, in
violation of our statute forbidding the bringing of a
further similar n1otion before a different judge, defendants moved again for a new trial, but the second judge
likewise ruled against them.
For the reasons heretofore set out, we feel that
there is no merit whatever in any of the contentions of
error of appellants. They are sham, smoke, and red
herring. The writer feels that this appeal is somewhat
akin to the last desperate effort of a drowning man to
clutch a straw-a last ditch stand for a new trial because
the dead man's lips are'now sealed.
1

Respondent respectfully prays that the judgment
of the lower court be affinned because there is ample
law and evidence to support one or all of the theories .
under which the jury founded its verdict, and no prejudicial error was committed.
Respectfully submitted,
MARY J. CONDAS,
ELLIOTT V.l. EVANS,
A !torneys for ReszJOndent.
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